- 1. Introduction
- 2. What Are IEC 61850 Control Services?
- 3. Control Architecture in an IEC 61850 Substation
- 4. Understanding the IEC 61850 Control Models
- 5. Direct Control with Normal Security
- 6. Select Before Operate (SBO)
- 7. Normal Security and Enhanced Security
- 8. IEC 61850 Control Data Objects
- 9. Important IEC 61850 Control Attributes
- 10. Circuit-Breaker Open and Close Control
- 11. Local and Remote Control Authority
- 12. Interlocking in IEC 61850 Control Systems
- 13. Synchronism Check and Closing Permissives
- 14. Control Integration with SICAM PAS and SCADA
- 15. Practical Example: MiCOM Feeder Relay Circuit-Breaker Control
- 16. Testing IEC 61850 Control Services
- 17. Troubleshooting Common Control Problems
- 18. Wireshark Analysis of IEC 61850 Control
- 19. Control Engineering and Cybersecurity
- 20. Practical Control Commissioning Checklist
- 21. Conclusion
- 22. Practical MiCOM and IEC 61850 Training by Elec-Engg
1. Introduction
Remote control is one of the most important functions in modern IEC 61850-based substation automation systems. Through IEC 61850 control services, an operator can request operations such as opening or closing a circuit breaker from a station HMI or control centre.
MiCOM protection relays can provide IEC 61850 control functionality for supported switchgear and other controllable objects. The relay receives control requests from an IEC 61850 client, checks the configured control conditions and processes the command according to its supported control model.
However, successful remote operation requires more than sending an open or close command. Engineers must understand:
- IEC 61850 control models.
- Direct control and Select Before Operate (SBO).
- Normal and enhanced security control.
- Control objects and data attributes.
- Command termination and feedback.
- Local and remote authority.
- Interlocking and permissive conditions.
- Circuit-breaker status supervision.
- SCADA control engineering.
- Commissioning and troubleshooting.
This article explains these concepts from a practical protection and substation automation engineering perspective.
Important: IEC 61850 defines control services and control models, but the availability and implementation of individual features depend on the exact MiCOM relay model, order code, firmware, communication hardware and configuration. Always verify the supported services using the applicable technical manual, MICS, PICS, PIXIT, ICD file and release notes.
2. What Are IEC 61850 Control Services?
IEC 61850 control services allow an IEC 61850 client to request an operation on a controllable data object within an IED.
For example, a SCADA operator may request that a feeder circuit breaker be opened.
The general communication path is:
SCADA HMI → Station controller → MMS communication → MiCOM relay → Control logic → Circuit breaker
The relay evaluates the control request according to its configuration and operating conditions.
If the request is accepted, the relay processes the command and operates the relevant control output or internal logic, depending on the implementation.
The resulting breaker position is then returned to the SCADA system through status information and reporting services.
2.1 Typical control applications
IEC 61850 control services may be used for:
- Circuit-breaker opening.
- Circuit-breaker closing.
- Disconnector operation.
- Earthing switch operation.
- Setting group selection.
- Other supported controllable functions.
Not all these functions are necessarily available in every MiCOM relay. The actual control objects and their supported services must be confirmed for the particular device.
3. Control Architecture in an IEC 61850 Substation
A typical control architecture includes the following components.
3.1 Operator HMI
The operator selects the equipment and requests an operation.
For example:
- Feeder 1 circuit breaker – Open.
- Feeder 1 circuit breaker – Close.
The HMI should display the equipment’s current position, control authority and command result.
3.2 Station controller
The station controller receives the operator request and communicates with the relevant protection relay using IEC 61850 MMS.
Examples of station-level systems include Siemens SICAM PAS and other compatible IEC 61850 SCADA platforms.
3.3 MiCOM relay
The relay receives and processes the control request.
Its control logic may consider:
- Control model.
- Local/remote status.
- Interlocking conditions.
- Switchgear position.
- Command validity.
- Configured permissions.
- Internal protection or control restrictions.
3.4 Circuit-breaker control circuit
After an accepted operation, the relay’s configured output or control interface operates the appropriate breaker control circuit.
The actual wiring arrangement depends on the switchgear and protection/control design.
4. Understanding the IEC 61850 Control Models
IEC 61850 defines several control models. Two important categories are:
- Direct control.
- Select Before Operate (SBO).
These control models determine how the client requests an operation and how the server processes the request.
The control model is associated with the controllable data object and is not simply a general setting that can be assumed to apply identically to every object in an IED.
The commonly defined control models are:
| Control model | Description |
|---|---|
| Direct control with normal security | Direct operation without a separate selection phase |
| SBO with normal security | Select first, then operate |
| Direct control with enhanced security | Direct operation with enhanced command feedback |
| SBO with enhanced security | Select and operate with enhanced command feedback |
The exact control models supported by a MiCOM relay must be verified for the specific device and firmware.
5. Direct Control with Normal Security
Direct control allows the IEC 61850 client to send an operate request without first selecting the object.
5.1 Operating principle
Consider a feeder circuit breaker.
The operator selects the Open command on the SCADA HMI.
The SCADA client sends the appropriate IEC 61850 control request to the relay.
The relay evaluates the request according to its configuration and, if accepted, initiates the operation.
A simplified sequence is:
- Operator selects Open.
- SCADA client sends the control request.
- MiCOM relay receives the request.
- Relay checks the control conditions.
- Relay accepts or rejects the request.
- If accepted, the configured control output is activated.
- Breaker position changes.
- The relay updates the status information.
- SCADA displays the final breaker position.
5.2 Advantages
- Simple command sequence.
- Fewer communication steps.
- Suitable for applications where direct control is permitted.
- Straightforward SCADA implementation.
5.3 Engineering considerations
Direct control does not mean that the relay must accept every request.
The relay may reject a command because of:
- Local control authority.
- Interlocking conditions.
- Incorrect object state.
- Invalid command parameters.
- Internal blocking conditions.
- Communication or access restrictions.
Direct control should only be enabled where the protection and control philosophy permits it.
6. Select Before Operate (SBO)
Select Before Operate is a control model in which the client first selects the control object and then sends a separate operate request.
This provides an additional selection stage before the operation is requested.
6.1 Operating principle
Suppose the operator wants to close a feeder circuit breaker.
The control sequence is:
- Operator selects the breaker.
- SCADA sends a Select request.
- The relay evaluates the selection request.
- The relay accepts or rejects the selection.
- If selection is successful, the client sends the Operate request.
- The relay evaluates the operation.
- If accepted, the breaker control operation is initiated.
- The relay reports the result and updated breaker position.
6.2 Why use SBO?
SBO can help reduce unintended operations by requiring an explicit selection stage.
It is particularly useful in systems where the operator must confirm the selected equipment before issuing a command.
For example, a substation may contain multiple outgoing feeders with similar names. The selection stage provides an additional step to confirm the intended control object.
6.3 Selection timeout
An SBO selection is not necessarily valid indefinitely.
The control object may have a configured selection timeout.
If the client does not send the Operate request within the allowed period, the selection may expire.
The SCADA system must handle this situation correctly and inform the operator.
6.4 Selection cancellation
Depending on the implementation, the selection may be cancelled by:
- An explicit cancellation request.
- Selection timeout.
- A new selection request.
- Other server-defined conditions.
The exact behavior must be checked in the device documentation.
7. Normal Security and Enhanced Security
IEC 61850 distinguishes between normal-security and enhanced-security control models.
These terms describe control service behavior and feedback mechanisms. They should not be confused with general cybersecurity protection or network authentication.
7.1 Normal security
Normal-security control provides the basic command and response sequence.
The client receives information about whether the request was accepted or rejected according to the applicable service behavior.
7.2 Enhanced security
Enhanced-security control provides additional command feedback, including command termination information.
This helps the client distinguish between command acceptance and completion of the control operation.
For example, an accepted command does not necessarily mean that the circuit breaker has successfully reached the requested position.
The control sequence and command termination information must be interpreted according to the supported IEC 61850 service model.
7.3 Important distinction
Three different conditions must be considered:
- Command accepted: The relay has accepted the control request.
- Command execution completed: The control operation has reached its defined completion state.
- Equipment feedback confirmed: The actual breaker position indicates the expected result.
These conditions should not be treated as identical.
A breaker could fail to operate mechanically even when the control command was accepted.
8. IEC 61850 Control Data Objects
Control services are associated with specific data objects in the IEC 61850 data model.
For switchgear control, commonly encountered logical node classes include:
- XCBR – Circuit breaker.
- XSWI – Switch or disconnector.
- CSWI – Switch controller.
The exact logical nodes and data objects exposed by a MiCOM relay depend on its implementation.
8.1 XCBR
XCBR represents circuit-breaker-related information.
It may provide information about:
- Breaker position.
- Breaker operating state.
- Switchgear-related status.
- Supported breaker operation information.
8.2 XSWI
XSWI represents switch-related functions and may be used for disconnector or earthing switch applications.
8.3 CSWI
CSWI represents switch control functionality.
It is associated with control operations and the processing of switch-related commands.
The logical node structure may differ between relay families and implementations. Do not assume that a specific CSWI or XCBR object is available merely because the logical node class exists in IEC 61850.
9. Important IEC 61850 Control Attributes
Control objects contain attributes that describe their status and behavior.
The following attributes are commonly relevant to IEC 61850 control engineering. Their availability and exact use depend on the data object and supported control model.
| Attribute | General purpose |
|---|---|
ctlModel | Defines the control model |
Oper | Control operation information |
SBO | Select Before Operate service-related information |
SBOw | Select Before Operate with enhanced security, where applicable |
Cancel | Cancels a selection or control process, where supported |
ctlVal | Requested control value |
origin | Identifies the origin of a command |
ctlNum | Control command number |
T | Control command timestamp |
Test | Test-related command indication |
Check | Additional check conditions, where supported |
stVal | Status value |
q | Quality |
t | Timestamp |
Engineers should use the actual data model and service definitions rather than assuming that every attribute appears in every control object.
10. Circuit-Breaker Open and Close Control
Circuit-breaker control is one of the most common IEC 61850 applications.
Consider a feeder protection relay controlling a circuit breaker.
10.1 Breaker opening
The operator requests an open operation.
The relay processes the command and operates the configured trip or open control path.
The breaker mechanism opens, and the auxiliary contacts change state.
The relay detects the position change and updates the relevant status information.
The SCADA system receives the new status through the supported reporting mechanism.
10.2 Breaker closing
The operator requests a close operation.
Before closing, the system may need to verify:
- Breaker is open.
- Local/remote authority permits remote operation.
- No active close-blocking condition exists.
- Protection lockout conditions are satisfied.
- Interlocking conditions permit closing.
- The switchgear is in a valid operating state.
After the close command is accepted, the relay operates the configured close circuit.
The breaker position must then be confirmed using the actual auxiliary contact feedback.
10.3 Open and close feedback
The SCADA system should distinguish between:
- Breaker open.
- Breaker closed.
- Breaker intermediate or indeterminate position.
- Breaker discrepancy.
- Breaker communication failure.
An intermediate position may occur during breaker travel or when auxiliary contact indications are inconsistent.
The HMI should not display a false confirmed closed state simply because a close command was accepted.
11. Local and Remote Control Authority
A protection relay or bay control system may have a local/remote selector or another mechanism for controlling operational authority.
This is essential for safe operation and maintenance.
11.1 Local mode
When the equipment is in local mode, remote operation may be blocked.
The operator must use the approved local control arrangement.
11.2 Remote mode
When remote authority is enabled, the station-level system may be permitted to issue control commands, subject to the configured conditions.
11.3 Authority indication in SCADA
The SCADA system should display the current control authority state.
For example:
| Indication | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Local | Local control authority selected |
| Remote | Remote control authority selected |
| Unknown | Status unavailable or invalid |
| Communication failure | Relay status cannot be confirmed |
The exact signal source and naming depend on the relay and switchgear design.
11.4 Engineering recommendation
Do not rely only on the SCADA HMI to enforce local/remote authority.
The relay or control system must enforce the actual control permission at the appropriate level.
12. Interlocking in IEC 61850 Control Systems
Interlocking prevents unsafe or invalid switching operations.
It is one of the most important aspects of substation control engineering.
For example, a disconnector should not normally be operated under load unless the switchgear is specifically designed and rated for that operation.
A closing operation may also be blocked if the associated earthing switch is closed.
12.1 Typical interlocking conditions
For a feeder circuit breaker, possible conditions include:
- Disconnector position.
- Earthing switch position.
- Busbar selection.
- Circuit-breaker position.
- Protection lockout.
- Synchronism-check condition.
- Local/remote authority.
- Equipment maintenance status.
The actual interlocking philosophy must be defined by the substation design.
12.2 Electrical interlocking
Electrical interlocking uses electrical signals and logic to prevent an operation when required conditions are not met.
12.3 Software interlocking
Software interlocking uses logic implemented in a control IED, station controller or another suitable automation device.
IEC 61850 provides data modeling and communication mechanisms that can support such applications, but the standard alone does not guarantee a particular interlocking implementation.
12.4 GOOSE-based interlocking
GOOSE can be used to exchange fast status and interlocking information between IEDs.
For example:
- A bay controller publishes disconnector position.
- Another IED subscribes to that information.
- The receiving device evaluates the relevant permissive conditions.
- The control request is accepted or blocked according to the implemented logic.
This arrangement requires careful engineering of:
- GOOSE datasets.
- Publisher and subscriber configuration.
- External references.
- Signal quality.
- Communication supervision.
- Fail-safe behavior.
- Testing and documentation.
GOOSE communication does not automatically create an interlocking function. The required logic and safety behavior must be implemented and validated.
13. Synchronism Check and Closing Permissives
Some circuit-breaker closing applications require synchronism-check supervision.
This is particularly relevant when connecting two energized electrical systems.
Synchronism-check logic may evaluate:
- Voltage difference.
- Phase-angle difference.
- Frequency difference.
- Dead-bus or live-bus conditions.
- Configured closing permissives.
IEC 61850 can communicate relevant status and control information, but the actual synchronism-check function must be implemented in the appropriate protection or control device.
A typical logical node associated with synchronism-check functions is RSYN.
Its availability in a specific MiCOM relay must be verified.
The closing sequence should not bypass the approved synchronism-check or interlocking philosophy.
14. Control Integration with SICAM PAS and SCADA
In a typical IEC 61850 system, SICAM PAS or another station controller acts as the client that sends control requests to the MiCOM relay.
A typical control path is:
Operator HMI → SICAM PAS → IEC 61850 MMS → MiCOM relay → Breaker control circuit
The feedback path is:
Breaker auxiliary contacts → MiCOM relay → IEC 61850 reporting → SICAM PAS → Operator HMI
14.1 SCADA control configuration
The SCADA engineer must configure:
- Correct IED identification.
- Correct control object reference.
- Control model.
- Open and close commands.
- Command permissions.
- Interlocking conditions.
- Command timeout handling.
- Status feedback.
- Command termination handling.
14.2 HMI control presentation
A good HMI should display:
- Equipment name.
- Current breaker position.
- Local/remote authority.
- Control availability.
- Open and close commands.
- Command in progress.
- Command accepted or rejected.
- Final equipment status.
- Relevant alarms.
14.3 Command feedback
The operator must receive clear information about the outcome of a command.
For example:
- Open command accepted.
- Open command rejected.
- Close command blocked by interlocking.
- Command timed out.
- Breaker position not confirmed.
- Communication failure.
A command should never be presented as successful solely because the client transmitted it.
15. Practical Example: MiCOM Feeder Relay Circuit-Breaker Control
Consider a medium-voltage feeder protected by a MiCOM relay.
The relay is integrated into a station-level IEC 61850 system.
The operator needs to open and close the feeder circuit breaker from the SCADA HMI.
15.1 Required signals
The following information may be required:
| Signal | Purpose |
|---|---|
| CB Open | Actual breaker open indication |
| CB Closed | Actual breaker closed indication |
| Local/Remote | Control authority |
| Protection Lockout | Close permissive or blocking status |
| Close Command | Remote closing request |
| Open Command | Remote opening request |
| Command Accepted | Control request feedback |
| Command Terminated | Command completion information, where supported |
| CB Discrepancy | Breaker position inconsistency |
| Relay Healthy | Device supervision |
These are conceptual engineering signals. Actual references and available control feedback must be obtained from the relay’s data model.
15.2 Example closing sequence
- The operator selects Feeder 1 on the HMI.
- The HMI displays the breaker as open.
- The HMI confirms remote control authority.
- The operator selects Close.
- The SCADA system sends the required IEC 61850 control request.
- The relay checks the supported control conditions.
- The relay evaluates interlocking and close permissives.
- If accepted, the close circuit is operated.
- The breaker closes.
- Auxiliary contacts confirm the closed position.
- The relay updates the breaker status.
- The SCADA system receives and displays the updated status.
If any required condition is not satisfied, the operation should be rejected or blocked according to the control design.
15.3 Example opening sequence
- The operator selects Feeder 1.
- The HMI displays the breaker as closed.
- The operator selects Open.
- The SCADA client sends the control request.
- The relay evaluates the request.
- The configured opening circuit is operated.
- The breaker opens.
- Auxiliary contacts confirm the open position.
- The relay updates the status.
- SCADA displays the breaker as open.
The exact relay output arrangement and control logic must be checked against the approved wiring diagrams and relay configuration.
16. Testing IEC 61850 Control Services
Control testing should be carried out in a controlled commissioning environment.
Testing should cover both the communication protocol and the actual equipment response.
16.1 Control model verification
Confirm:
- Supported control model.
- Direct control availability.
- SBO availability.
- Normal or enhanced security behavior.
- Selection timeout.
- Command cancellation behavior.
- Supported command parameters.
16.2 Select Before Operate testing
If SBO is implemented, test:
- Select the control object.
- Confirm selection acceptance.
- Send the Operate request.
- Confirm operation acceptance.
- Confirm command completion.
- Verify actual equipment feedback.
- Test selection timeout.
- Test cancellation where supported.
16.3 Direct control testing
If direct control is implemented, test:
- Send an authorized command.
- Verify command acceptance or rejection.
- Confirm the control output operates correctly.
- Verify actual breaker position.
- Confirm SCADA feedback.
- Check timeout and failure indications.
16.4 Interlocking tests
Test both permitted and prohibited operating conditions.
Examples:
- Breaker close with all required permissives satisfied.
- Breaker close with an earthing switch closed.
- Breaker close with protection lockout active.
- Remote operation while local authority is selected.
- Operation when a required status signal is invalid.
The expected response must be defined in the approved control philosophy.
16.5 Control circuit testing
Verify:
- Relay output contact operation.
- DC supply availability.
- Trip and close circuit continuity.
- Breaker auxiliary contact feedback.
- Command pulse duration.
- Breaker operating mechanism response.
- Circuit supervision alarms, where implemented.
17. Troubleshooting Common Control Problems
| Problem | Possible cause | Investigation |
|---|---|---|
| SCADA command not accepted | Incorrect control reference | Check the actual data model |
| Select request rejected | Object unavailable or selection conditions not met | Check control state and permissions |
| SBO selection expires | Operate request not sent within timeout | Check selection timeout and client sequence |
| Direct control rejected | Authority or interlocking restriction | Check local/remote state and permissives |
| Command accepted but breaker does not move | Control circuit or breaker mechanism problem | Check output contacts, DC supply and wiring |
| Breaker moves but SCADA does not update | Reporting or feedback mapping issue | Check status object and RCB configuration |
| Command times out | Communication or control sequence problem | Check MMS traffic and command handling |
| Incorrect breaker position | Auxiliary contact or wiring problem | Verify breaker feedback circuit |
| Close operation blocked | Protection lockout or interlocking condition | Identify the active blocking condition |
| Multiple operators issue commands | Client coordination or control reservation issue | Review supported control handling and client configuration |
18. Wireshark Analysis of IEC 61850 Control
Wireshark can help identify communication problems during IEC 61850 control testing.
MMS traffic can normally be identified using:
tcp.port == 102
Useful additional filters include:
| Filter | Purpose |
|---|---|
tcp.port == 102 | MMS-related traffic |
tcp.analysis.retransmission | TCP retransmissions |
tcp.flags.reset == 1 | TCP reset packets |
ip.addr == 192.168.10.11 | Traffic involving a particular relay IP |
When analyzing control communication, engineers should examine:
- MMS association establishment.
- Control request sequence.
- Select request, where applicable.
- Operate request.
- Positive or negative responses.
- Command termination information, where supported.
- Subsequent status reports.
A packet capture can show whether a request was transmitted and how the communication service responded. It does not, by itself, prove that the circuit breaker physically operated. The actual equipment feedback must also be verified.
19. Control Engineering and Cybersecurity
Remote control of electrical equipment requires strict access management.
Recommended measures include:
- Restricting remote control to authorized operators.
- Separating engineering access from routine operation.
- Applying network segmentation.
- Protecting engineering workstations.
- Managing user credentials.
- Recording operator actions.
- Monitoring communication failures.
- Maintaining configuration backups.
- Applying approved change-management procedures.
IEC 61850 control models and IEC 62351 cybersecurity measures address different aspects of the system.
SBO is not a substitute for cybersecurity authentication, and enhanced-security control should not be interpreted as proof that all cybersecurity requirements have been implemented.
Always verify the actual security features supported by the relay and the complete station automation system.
20. Practical Control Commissioning Checklist
Control configuration
- Confirm the exact MiCOM relay model and firmware.
- Verify supported control models.
- Identify the actual control data objects.
- Confirm direct control or SBO configuration.
- Verify command parameters and permissions.
- Check selection timeout and cancellation behavior where applicable.
Control authority and interlocking
- Verify local/remote selection.
- Confirm breaker position feedback.
- Check protection lockout conditions.
- Test electrical interlocking.
- Test software interlocking.
- Verify synchronism-check permissives where applicable.
- Test invalid or unavailable input conditions.
SCADA engineering
- Map open and close commands.
- Map command feedback.
- Map breaker status.
- Display control authority.
- Configure command timeout handling.
- Verify alarm and event messages.
- Confirm final status feedback.
Commissioning
- Test direct control where supported.
- Test SBO where supported.
- Test rejected commands.
- Test selection timeout.
- Test interlocking restrictions.
- Test actual breaker opening.
- Test actual breaker closing.
- Verify auxiliary contact feedback.
- Verify event timestamps.
- Record test results and approved configuration.
21. Conclusion
IEC 61850 control services provide a standardized approach to remote switching and control in modern substation automation systems.
For MiCOM relay integration, engineers must understand the supported control models, direct control, Select Before Operate, command feedback, local/remote authority and interlocking requirements.
The most important principle is that a control command, its acceptance, its completion and the actual equipment position are separate conditions that must be engineered and tested correctly.
A reliable system requires coordinated engineering of the relay, station controller, SCADA HMI, control wiring and interlocking logic.
22. Practical MiCOM and IEC 61850 Training by Elec-Engg
Elec-Engg provides practical training for protection, commissioning and substation automation engineers.
Relevant training topics include:
- MiCOM protection relay configuration.
- IEC 61850 fundamentals and engineering.
- MMS communication and SCADA integration.
- Direct control and SBO.
- IEC 61850 GOOSE configuration and testing.
- Interlocking and bay control.
- SCL engineering and device integration.
- SICAM PAS configuration.
- Wireshark communication analysis.
- Practical relay testing and commissioning.
Training formats include video courses, structured self-paced training, face-to-face training and customized in-house programs.
Practical courses by Dr Saeed Roostaee / Elec-Engg
Website: https://elec-engg.com/
