NARI Substation Automation System (SAS): Complete Guide to Digital Substation Architecture, Protection IEDs, Bay Control, IEC 61850, SCADA Integration, Gateways, Redundancy and Commissioning
- 1. NARI Digital Substation Architecture
- 2. Protection IEDs, BCUs and Communication Controllers
- 3. Station Bus and Process Bus
- 4. GOOSE-Based Interlocking
- 5. MMS Monitoring and Control
- 6. SCADA Integration
- 7. Gateway and Protocol Converter Engineering
- 8. IEC 60870-5-103 Integration
- 9. IEC 61850 Network Architecture
- 10. Redundancy and Network Availability
- 11. Time Synchronization
- 12. SAS Testing and Commissioning
- 12.1 Introduction to SAS Commissioning
- 12.2 Pre-Commissioning Checks
- 12.3 Protection IED Testing
- 12.4 BCU Functional Testing
- 12.5 GOOSE Communication Testing
- 12.6 MMS Testing
- 12.7 SCADA Point-to-Point Testing
- 12.8 Remote Control Testing
- 12.9 Gateway Testing
- 12.10 Redundancy Testing
- 12.11 Final SAS Commissioning Checklist
- NARI SAS commissioning checklist
- 13. Engineering Challenges and Common SAS Problems
- 14. NARI SAS Engineering: Practical Project Example
- 15. Recommended Technical Standards and References
- 16. NARI Substation Automation Training by Elec-Engg
- 17. Conclusion
NARI Substation Automation System (SAS) is an integrated platform for monitoring, controlling, protecting and managing electrical substations. It combines protection intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), bay control units (BCUs), communication controllers, Ethernet networks, station-level SCADA systems and time synchronization infrastructure to provide coordinated operation of substation equipment.
Modern NARI-based substation automation systems use standardized communication technologies, particularly IEC 61850, to exchange protection signals, measurements, equipment status, alarms and control commands between different devices.
NARI provides a range of protection and automation products, including PCS-series protection relays, bay control equipment and communication solutions. These devices can be integrated into different substation automation architectures depending on the project requirements, equipment model, firmware, supported protocols and engineering configuration.
This article provides a comprehensive engineering guide to NARI Substation Automation Systems, covering the complete architecture from the process and bay levels to station-level SCADA, communication gateways, network redundancy, time synchronization, testing and commissioning.
1. NARI Digital Substation Architecture
1.1 Introduction to Substation Automation Systems
A Substation Automation System is responsible for coordinating the monitoring, protection, control and communication functions of an electrical substation.
In conventional substations, many functions depend on hardwired connections between protection relays, control panels, meters, annunciators and SCADA equipment.
Modern SAS architectures replace or reduce many of these conventional connections through digital communication networks.
The main objectives of a substation automation system are:
- Centralized monitoring of electrical equipment.
- Remote and local control of circuit breakers and disconnectors.
- Integration of protection and control IEDs.
- Collection of analog measurements.
- Alarm and event management.
- Sequence-of-events recording.
- Interlocking between switching devices.
- Communication with control centers.
- Disturbance and fault information collection.
- Improved operational availability.
NARI-based SAS implementations can combine protection devices, bay control units, communication controllers and station-level systems to achieve these functions.
1.2 Three-Level Digital Substation Architecture
A typical digital substation is divided into three main levels.
Process Level
The process level interfaces with primary electrical equipment.
Typical equipment includes:
- Current transformers (CTs).
- Voltage transformers (VTs).
- Circuit breakers.
- Disconnectors.
- Earthing switches.
- Instrument transformers and sensors.
- Merging units, where applicable.
- Process-level interface devices.
Bay Level
The bay level contains protection and control IEDs responsible for individual feeders, transformers, busbars, generators and transmission lines.
Typical equipment includes:
- NARI feeder protection relays.
- NARI line protection relays.
- NARI transformer protection relays.
- NARI generator protection relays.
- NARI bay control units.
- Bay-level communication equipment.
Station Level
The station level provides centralized monitoring and control.
Typical equipment includes:
- Station SCADA.
- Operator HMI.
- Engineering workstation.
- Communication gateways.
- Station controllers.
- Event and alarm servers.
- Time synchronization equipment.
- Remote control center communication interfaces.
1.3 Typical NARI SAS Architecture
A simplified architecture is shown below:
CONTROL CENTER
|
Remote SCADA
|
Communication
Gateway
|
STATION LEVEL
|
+------------+------------+
| | |
Station HMI Engineering
SCADA Workstation
| | |
+------------+------------+
|
STATION BUS
Ethernet LAN
|
+------------+------------+
| | |
BAY 1 BAY 2 BAY 3
| | |
Protection Protection Protection
IED IED IED
| | |
BCU BCU BCU
| | |
+------------+------------+
|
PROCESS LEVEL
|
Circuit Breakers
Disconnectors
CTs and VTs
Other Equipment
This is a conceptual architecture. The actual NARI system may use integrated or separate protection and control devices, redundant station networks and different gateway arrangements.
1.4 Main Communication Technologies
| Technology | Application |
|---|---|
| IEC 61850 MMS | Monitoring and control |
| IEC 61850 GOOSE | Fast event and interlocking communication |
| IEC 61850 Sampled Values | Digital current and voltage transmission |
| IEC 60870-5-103 | Protection relay communication |
| IEC 60870-5-104 | Telecontrol communication |
| Modbus TCP/RTU | Equipment and auxiliary system integration |
| SNTP/NTP | Time synchronization |
| PTP | Precision time synchronization |
| PRP/HSR | Ethernet network redundancy |
Not every NARI device supports all these protocols. The exact capabilities must be verified for the selected model and firmware.
2. Protection IEDs, BCUs and Communication Controllers
2.1 Protection Intelligent Electronic Devices
Protection IEDs are responsible for detecting abnormal electrical conditions and initiating appropriate protection actions.
NARI protection equipment covers various applications, including:
- Transmission line protection.
- Feeder protection.
- Transformer protection.
- Generator protection.
- Busbar protection.
- Motor protection.
- Capacitor bank protection.
- Voltage and frequency protection.
The PCS product families include protection and control devices for different applications. Exact model functions must be established using the relevant NARI technical documentation.
2.2 Main Functions of Protection IEDs
Protection IEDs typically perform:
Protection
- Overcurrent protection.
- Earth fault protection.
- Distance protection.
- Differential protection.
- Overvoltage and undervoltage protection.
- Frequency protection.
- Breaker failure protection.
- Thermal overload protection.
Monitoring
- Phase currents.
- Phase voltages.
- Active and reactive power.
- Frequency.
- Power factor.
- Protection element status.
- Circuit breaker status.
Communication
- MMS communication.
- GOOSE communication.
- IEC 60870-5-103, where supported.
- Other supported communication protocols.
Event Recording
- Protection events.
- Trip records.
- Disturbance records.
- Fault measurements.
- Communication diagnostics.
2.3 Bay Control Units
A Bay Control Unit is responsible for monitoring and controlling the switching equipment associated with a particular substation bay.
Typical functions include:
- Circuit breaker control.
- Disconnector control.
- Earthing switch control.
- Equipment position monitoring.
- Electrical and mechanical interlocking.
- Local and remote control.
- Alarm generation.
- Measurement acquisition.
- Communication with station SCADA.
PCS-9705S Bay Control Unit-NR Electric Co. Ltd
The NARI PCS-9705S is an example of equipment identified as a bay control unit. Its exact control, measurement and communication capabilities should be checked against its official product documentation.
2.4 Protection IED Versus BCU
| Feature | Protection IED | BCU |
|---|---|---|
| Main purpose | Electrical protection | Bay monitoring and control |
| Fault detection | Main responsibility | Generally not primary protection |
| Breaker control | Depends on design | Main application |
| Interlocking | Protection-related or configured logic | Bay switching interlocking |
| Measurements | Protection and monitoring | Bay monitoring |
| GOOSE | Depends on model | Depends on model |
| MMS | Depends on model | Depends on model |
In some projects, protection and bay control functions are integrated into a single device. In other projects, separate IEDs are used for protection and control.
2.5 Communication Controllers
Communication controllers and gateways provide interfaces between bay-level equipment and station-level systems.
Their functions may include:
- Data acquisition.
- Protocol conversion.
- Communication aggregation.
- Data mapping.
- Remote control forwarding.
- Time synchronization distribution.
- Communication supervision.
- Connection to remote control centers.
A communication controller may collect data from multiple protection IEDs and provide a unified interface to the station SCADA or control center.
3. Station Bus and Process Bus
3.1 Station Bus
The station bus connects bay-level IEDs with station-level systems and other network participants.
Typical applications include:
- MMS communication.
- GOOSE messaging.
- SCADA monitoring.
- Remote control.
- Alarm and event transmission.
- Engineering access.
- IED configuration and diagnostics.
A station bus may use managed industrial Ethernet switches and redundant network architecture.
3.2 Process Bus
The process bus connects process-level equipment and interfaces with protection and control IEDs.
Its applications can include:
- Sampled Values transmission.
- GOOSE-based process signals.
- Merging unit communication.
- Digital interface to circuit breaker equipment.
- Process-level status and measurement exchange.
A fully digital process bus can reduce the amount of conventional copper wiring between the primary equipment interfaces and the protection and control system.
3.3 Station Bus Versus Process Bus
| Feature | Station Bus | Process Bus |
|---|---|---|
| Main purpose | Station and bay communication | Process-level communication |
| Typical devices | IEDs, SCADA, gateways | Merging units, process interfaces |
| MMS | Common | Application-dependent |
| GOOSE | Yes | Yes |
| Sampled Values | Not normally its primary purpose | Main application |
| Circuit breaker control | Through bay-level control | Process interface, where implemented |
| Network requirements | High availability | High availability and performance |
3.4 Network Segmentation
A well-designed SAS network should separate communication traffic according to its purpose.
Possible network segments include:
- Station SCADA network.
- Protection IED network.
- GOOSE communication network.
- Engineering access network.
- Process bus network.
- Remote access network.
VLANs can be used to separate traffic logically.
Network segmentation improves network management, security and troubleshooting.
4. GOOSE-Based Interlocking
4.1 Introduction to Interlocking
Interlocking prevents unsafe switching operations by checking the electrical and mechanical conditions of the substation before allowing an operation.
For example, a disconnector should not normally be operated under load unless the switching arrangement specifically permits it.
An interlocking system may consider:
- Circuit breaker position.
- Disconnector position.
- Earthing switch position.
- Busbar selection.
- Voltage presence.
- Local and remote control mode.
- Protection status.
- Equipment-specific permissive conditions.
4.2 Conventional Interlocking
In conventional substations, interlocking signals are exchanged through hardwired binary inputs and outputs.
This requires physical wiring between control devices.
4.3 GOOSE-Based Interlocking
In digital substations, interlocking signals can be exchanged through GOOSE communication.
For example:
- Bay 1 publishes circuit breaker status.
- Bay 2 subscribes to that status.
- Bay 2 processes the information through its interlocking logic.
- The switching command is permitted or blocked according to the approved switching philosophy.
IEC 61850 and GOOSE, MMS protocols
4.4 Example: Disconnector Interlocking
Consider a feeder bay with:
- Circuit breaker CB1.
- Busbar disconnector DS1.
- Line disconnector DS2.
- Earthing switch ES1.
An illustrative interlocking philosophy may include:
| Switching operation | Example condition |
|---|---|
| Open circuit breaker | Permitted according to operating mode |
| Close circuit breaker | Required disconnectors correctly positioned; no active blocking condition |
| Operate disconnector | Breaker open, subject to approved design |
| Close earthing switch | Required isolation and voltage conditions satisfied |
| Close line disconnector | Earthing switch open |
The exact conditions depend on the substation single-line diagram and approved switching philosophy.
4.5 GOOSE Interlocking Engineering
The engineering process involves:
- Identifying the required interlocking signals.
- Identifying the publishing IED.
- Identifying the subscribing IED.
- Creating the GOOSE dataset.
- Configuring the GOOSE control block.
- Mapping subscriber signals.
- Implementing interlocking logic.
- Defining communication failure behavior.
- Testing every switching condition.
4.6 Fail-Safe Considerations
Interlocking logic must not blindly trust received GOOSE data.
The design should consider:
- Invalid quality.
- Communication loss.
- Stale information.
- Test mode.
- Configuration mismatch.
- Network failure.
- Incorrect equipment position.
- Recovery after communication restoration.
The safe response must be established by the project’s protection and operational safety philosophy.
5. MMS Monitoring and Control
5.1 Introduction to MMS
Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) is used by IEC 61850 for client-server communication.
In a typical NARI SAS implementation:
- Protection IEDs provide MMS server functionality.
- Bay control units provide MMS server functionality where supported.
- Station SCADA operates as an MMS client.
- Engineering workstations can access supported IED information.
5.2 MMS Monitoring
MMS allows the station-level system to retrieve information such as:
- Circuit breaker position.
- Disconnector position.
- Protection trip status.
- Protection element pickup.
- Current measurements.
- Voltage measurements.
- Active and reactive power.
- Frequency.
- Relay health.
- Communication alarms.
5.3 MMS Control
MMS can also support control operations, depending on the device’s implementation and configured control model.
Examples include:
- Circuit breaker opening.
- Circuit breaker closing.
- Disconnector operation.
- Equipment control.
- Setpoint or mode changes, where supported.
IEC 61850 defines different control models, including:
- Direct control.
- Select-before-operate (SBO).
- Enhanced security control models.
The actual control model must be verified for the individual NARI device and data object.
5.4 Control Command Sequence
A typical select-before-operate sequence is:
SCADA Operator
|
v
Select Command
|
v
IED Validation
|
v
Select Confirmation
|
v
Operate Command
|
v
IED Interlocking
|
v
Breaker Operation
|
v
Position Feedback
|
v
SCADA Update
5.5 MMS Engineering Considerations
Engineers should verify:
- Correct logical device references.
- Correct data object references.
- Control model.
- Access permissions.
- Command termination.
- Position feedback.
- Interlocking conditions.
- Control authority.
- Local/remote mode.
- Communication supervision.
A successful MMS connection does not automatically mean that remote control is enabled or safe.
6. SCADA Integration
6.1 Introduction to SCADA Integration
SCADA integration is one of the most important functions of a Substation Automation System.
The station-level SCADA system collects information from protection IEDs, bay control units, meters and auxiliary equipment. It provides operators with a centralized interface for monitoring and controlling the substation.
In a NARI-based SAS architecture, SCADA integration can be implemented using IEC 61850 MMS, communication gateways and other supported communication protocols.
6.2 Main SCADA Functions
A typical substation SCADA system provides:
Monitoring
- Circuit breaker status.
- Disconnector and earthing switch status.
- Protection relay status.
- Electrical measurements.
- Transformer monitoring.
- Auxiliary supply status.
- Communication health.
Control
- Circuit breaker open and close commands.
- Disconnector operations.
- Earthing switch operations.
- Equipment mode selection.
- Remote switching operations, where permitted.
Alarm Management
- Protection trips.
- Protection starts.
- Communication failures.
- Equipment alarms.
- Power supply failures.
- Abnormal operating conditions.
Event Management
- Sequence-of-events recording.
- Time-stamped alarms.
- Switching history.
- Protection operation records.
- Disturbance information.
6.3 SCADA Communication Architecture
CONTROL CENTER
|
Remote SCADA
|
IEC 60870-5-104
|
SAS GATEWAY
|
STATION SCADA
|
STATION LAN
|
+-----------+-----------+
| | |
NARI NARI NARI
Feeder Transformer Bay
Protection Protection Control
IED IED Unit
The gateway can provide the interface between the station automation system and the remote control center.
6.4 SCADA Database Engineering
SCADA database engineering involves defining the signals that will be displayed, monitored and controlled.
A typical signal database includes:
| Signal category | Example |
|---|---|
| Single-point status | Breaker open/closed |
| Double-point status | Disconnector position |
| Analog measurement | Phase current |
| Analog measurement | Busbar voltage |
| Protection indication | Overcurrent trip |
| Alarm | Relay unhealthy |
| Control | Breaker open |
| Control | Breaker close |
| Counter | Breaker operation count |
6.5 Point-to-Point Verification
During commissioning, each signal should be checked from the originating IED to the SCADA display.
For example:
- Change the circuit breaker status under an approved test condition.
- Verify the status in the NARI IED.
- Verify the corresponding IEC 61850 data object.
- Confirm that the MMS report is generated.
- Check that the SCADA system receives the signal.
- Confirm that the correct indication appears on the HMI.
The same approach should be applied to measurements, alarms and control feedback.
6.6 SCADA Graphics and HMI
The HMI should represent the actual electrical single-line diagram.
Typical displays include:
- Substation overview.
- Busbar arrangement.
- Feeder bay diagrams.
- Transformer bay diagrams.
- Circuit breaker status.
- Disconnector status.
- Electrical measurements.
- Alarm lists.
- Event lists.
- Communication diagnostics.
The graphical representation must use consistent equipment identification and status conventions.
7. Gateway and Protocol Converter Engineering
7.1 What Is a Communication Gateway?
A communication gateway connects different communication systems and protocols.
In a substation, the gateway commonly collects information from protection relays and bay control units and transfers it to station SCADA or a remote control center.
A gateway may also provide protocol conversion, data mapping, event handling and communication supervision.
7.2 Main Gateway Functions
Typical functions include:
- Communication with multiple IEDs.
- IEC 61850 client functionality.
- IEC 60870-5-103 master functionality.
- IEC 60870-5-104 server functionality.
- Modbus communication.
- Data acquisition.
- Signal mapping.
- Protocol conversion.
- Remote control forwarding.
- Time synchronization.
- Communication diagnostics.
The exact functionality depends on the gateway hardware and software.
7.3 Typical NARI Gateway Architecture
SCADA Data Gateway – Overview
REMOTE CONTROL CENTER
|
IEC 60870-5-104
|
COMMUNICATION
GATEWAY
|
STATION LAN
|
+-----------+-----------+
| | |
IEC 61850 IEC 103 Modbus
| | |
NARI IEDs Legacy Auxiliary
Relays Equipment
7.4 Protocol Conversion
Protocol conversion is required when equipment uses different communication standards.
For example:
- A protection relay communicates using IEC 60870-5-103.
- A gateway collects the relay information.
- The gateway maps the information into its internal database.
- The gateway transmits the mapped information to SCADA using IEC 60870-5-104.
This allows older protection equipment to participate in modern substation automation systems.
7.5 Data Mapping
Gateway engineering requires careful mapping between source and destination points.
Example:
| Source device | Source information | Destination |
|---|---|---|
| Feeder relay | Phase overcurrent trip | SCADA alarm |
| Feeder relay | Phase current | SCADA analog point |
| Transformer relay | Differential trip | SCADA alarm |
| Bay control unit | Breaker position | SCADA status |
| Auxiliary controller | DC supply failure | SCADA alarm |
The mapping must preserve:
- Signal meaning.
- Engineering units.
- Scaling.
- Polarity.
- Quality.
- Timestamp.
- Alarm priority.
- Control authority.
7.6 Gateway Engineering Workflow
A practical engineering sequence is:
- Identify all connected IEDs.
- Obtain device communication manuals.
- Identify the supported protocols.
- Configure gateway communication interfaces.
- Define device addresses.
- Configure communication parameters.
- Import or create the point database.
- Map source signals.
- Configure destination protocols.
- Define control mappings.
- Test data acquisition.
- Test event transmission.
- Test remote control.
- Verify communication failure handling.
7.7 Important Gateway Troubleshooting Checks
| Problem | Possible cause |
|---|---|
| IED not detected | Incorrect address or communication settings |
| Missing analog values | Incorrect data mapping |
| Incorrect measurements | Scaling or unit mismatch |
| Wrong alarm | Incorrect point assignment |
| No remote control | Control mapping or permission issue |
| Delayed events | Communication or processing issue |
| Duplicate points | Database configuration error |
| Time mismatch | Synchronization problem |
8. IEC 60870-5-103 Integration
8.1 Introduction to IEC 60870-5-103
IEC 60870-5-103 is a communication standard developed for protection equipment interfaces.
It is commonly used in substations containing conventional numerical protection relays and older protection systems.
The protocol allows protection devices to exchange information with supervisory systems and communication gateways.
Typical applications include:
- Protection event transmission.
- Fault indications.
- Measurements.
- Device status.
- Protection disturbance information.
- Selected control and parameter functions, where supported.
8.2 IEC 60870-5-103 Communication Architecture
STATION SCADA
|
GATEWAY
|
IEC 60870-5-103
|
+-------+-------+
| | |
Relay 1 Relay 2 Relay 3
| | |
Feeder Transformer Line
Relay Relay Relay
The gateway commonly operates as the IEC 60870-5-103 master, while the protection relays act as controlled devices.
8.3 Important Communication Parameters
Typical engineering parameters include:
- Device address.
- Communication interface.
- Baud rate.
- Parity.
- Stop bits.
- Communication mode.
- Link supervision.
- Common information handling.
- Function type.
- Information number.
The available parameters depend on the relay and interface.
8.4 Serial Communication
IEC 60870-5-103 installations commonly use serial communication interfaces.
Typical physical interfaces include:
- RS-485.
- RS-232, where supported.
For RS-485 networks, engineers should check:
- Correct A/B polarity.
- Cable type.
- Shielding.
- Termination resistors.
- Bus topology.
- Device addressing.
- Communication speed.
- Grounding arrangements.
8.5 IEC 60870-5-103 Data Engineering
The gateway or SCADA engineer must understand how protection information is represented by the relay.
Important information includes:
- Protection function identification.
- General indications.
- Disturbance indications.
- Fault measurements.
- Device status.
- Event information.
The relay-specific protocol implementation and supported function types should be checked using its communication manual.
8.6 IEC 103 to IEC 104 Conversion
A common application is integrating IEC 60870-5-103 protection relays into an IEC 60870-5-104 control center.
NARI / Other Protection Relay
|
IEC 60870-5-103
|
Gateway
|
Data Mapping
|
IEC 60870-5-104
|
Remote Control Center
The gateway performs the required mapping between the source and destination information models.
Not all source information is necessarily transferable without limitations. The mapping should be checked for event semantics, quality, timestamps and control support.
8.7 IEC 103 Commissioning Tests
The commissioning engineer should verify:
- Physical serial connection.
- Correct device address.
- Communication parameters.
- Link establishment.
- Device identification.
- General interrogation or supported initialization procedure.
- Protection event transmission.
- Measurement acquisition.
- Disturbance information.
- Gateway data mapping.
- SCADA indication.
- Communication failure alarms.
9. IEC 61850 Network Architecture
9.1 Introduction
IEC 61850 network architecture is a fundamental component of modern digital substation automation.
It defines standardized communication services and information models that allow IEDs from different manufacturers to exchange data.
For NARI SAS installations, IEC 61850 can be used to integrate protection devices, BCUs, gateways and station-level SCADA systems.
9.2 Ethernet Network Design
A typical station Ethernet network includes:
- Managed Ethernet switches.
- Protection IEDs.
- Bay control units.
- Station SCADA servers.
- Communication gateways.
- Engineering workstations.
- Time synchronization equipment.
The network should be designed according to the required communication performance, availability and cybersecurity requirements.
9.3 Network Topologies
Common network topologies include:
Star Topology
Each IED connects to a central switch.
Advantages:
- Simple engineering.
- Easy troubleshooting.
- Straightforward network management.
Limitations:
- Central switch failure can affect connected devices.
- Redundancy must be provided separately.
Ring Topology
IEDs and network switches are connected through a ring arrangement.
Advantages:
- Alternative communication paths.
- Potentially improved availability.
- Reduced dependence on one switch.
Limitations:
- Requires a supported redundancy mechanism.
- Recovery behavior must be verified.
Redundant Dual-Network Architecture
Two separate Ethernet networks provide independent communication paths.
Advantages:
- Improved network availability.
- Reduced single-point failure risk.
- Support for seamless redundancy when using compatible technology.
9.4 VLAN Configuration
Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) can separate communication traffic.
For example:
| VLAN | Purpose |
|---|---|
| VLAN 10 | Station SCADA |
| VLAN 20 | Protection IED communication |
| VLAN 30 | GOOSE traffic |
| VLAN 40 | Engineering access |
| VLAN 50 | Auxiliary systems |
These are illustrative assignments, not mandatory IEC 61850 values.
VLAN configuration should be coordinated with the network design and IED communication capabilities.
9.5 GOOSE Traffic Prioritization
GOOSE is used for fast event-based communication.
Ethernet priority mechanisms can be configured to prioritize critical traffic over less time-sensitive traffic.
The engineering team should verify:
- VLAN tagging.
- Priority values.
- Switch QoS configuration.
- Multicast handling.
- Network congestion.
- End-to-end communication performance.
9.6 Network Monitoring
The station network should be continuously monitored.
Important parameters include:
- Link status.
- Switch health.
- Port errors.
- Network utilization.
- Packet loss.
- Multicast traffic.
- Communication interruptions.
- Redundancy status.
Network monitoring is particularly important in substations where GOOSE communication participates in protection or switching logic.
10. Redundancy and Network Availability
10.1 Importance of Network Redundancy
Substation automation systems must maintain reliable communication between protection IEDs, control units and station-level systems.
A single network failure should not unnecessarily interrupt critical monitoring or protection communication.
Network redundancy provides alternative communication paths or duplicate network infrastructure.
10.2 Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP)
PRP is defined in IEC 62439-3.
It uses two independent LANs, generally referred to as LAN A and LAN B.
A PRP-capable device transmits duplicate frames through both networks.
The receiving device accepts the first valid frame and discards the duplicate.
HSR & PRP Redundancy for Reliable Substation Networks
Simplified architecture:
NARI IED
|
Dual Interfaces
/ \
/ \
LAN A LAN B
| |
Switch A Switch B
| |
+-----+------+
|
Station System
The two networks should be sufficiently independent to reduce common-mode failure risks.
10.3 High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR)
HSR is another redundancy method defined in IEC 62439-3.
It uses a ring topology in which devices transmit duplicate frames in opposite directions.
The receiving device accepts the first valid frame.
PPT – HSR – High Availability Seamless Redundancy Fault-tolerance in Ethernet networks IEC 62439-3 PowerPoint Presentation – ID:4751349
10.4 PRP Versus HSR
| Feature | PRP | HSR |
|---|---|---|
| Network topology | Two independent LANs | Ring |
| Duplicate transmission | Yes | Yes |
| Seamless recovery | Yes, with compatible implementation | Yes, with compatible implementation |
| Network structure | Dual network | Ring network |
| Engineering complexity | Two LANs | Ring configuration |
| Main application | Redundant station networks | Redundant ring networks |
10.5 Redundant SCADA Servers
Network redundancy alone does not guarantee system availability.
The station-level SCADA system may also require:
- Primary server.
- Standby server.
- Redundant database.
- Redundant communication interfaces.
- Backup power supplies.
- Redundant network switches.
The failover behavior should be verified through controlled testing.
10.6 Redundancy Testing
Typical tests include:
- Verify normal communication.
- Disconnect LAN A.
- Confirm that communication continues through LAN B.
- Restore LAN A.
- Disconnect LAN B.
- Confirm that communication continues through LAN A.
- Verify that no unintended control operation occurs.
- Check GOOSE and MMS communication.
- Verify recovery behavior.
- Record the results.
The test must use compatible PRP/HSR equipment and follow the approved network commissioning procedure.
11. Time Synchronization
11.1 Importance of Time Synchronization
Accurate time synchronization is essential for modern substation automation.
Protection IEDs, BCUs, gateways and SCADA servers generate time-stamped events.
If their clocks are not synchronized, event sequences can become difficult to interpret.
Time synchronization is particularly important for:
- Sequence-of-events recording.
- Protection disturbance analysis.
- Fault investigation.
- Breaker operation records.
- GOOSE event correlation.
- SCADA alarm chronology.
11.2 Common Time Synchronization Methods
NTP — Network Time Protocol
NTP synchronizes clocks over an IP network.
It is widely used for computers, SCADA servers and network-connected equipment.
SNTP — Simple Network Time Protocol
SNTP provides a simplified time synchronization implementation.
It is used by some protection and automation devices.
PTP — Precision Time Protocol
PTP is defined by IEEE 1588.
It provides more precise clock synchronization than typical NTP implementations when the complete architecture supports the required precision.
IRIG-B
IRIG-B is a time distribution format commonly used in protection and power system applications.
It can distribute time information through dedicated interfaces.
11.3 Typical Time Synchronization Architecture
GNSS ANTENNA
|
TIME SERVER
|
Station Network
|
+-----------+-----------+
| | |
NARI NARI NARI
Feeder Transformer Bay
IED IED Unit
| | |
+-----------+-----------+
|
SCADA
11.4 Time Synchronization Engineering Checks
Verify:
- Time source availability.
- GNSS receiver status, where used.
- Correct time zone.
- UTC versus local-time configuration.
- Synchronization protocol.
- Network reachability.
- Clock offset.
- Loss-of-synchronization alarm.
- Timestamp quality.
- Holdover behavior, where supported.
11.5 Practical Time Synchronization Testing
A commissioning engineer can generate a controlled event in two different IEDs and compare the recorded timestamps.
The objective is to verify that:
- Both IEDs use the intended time source.
- Events are recorded correctly.
- The time difference meets project requirements.
- SCADA receives the correct timestamps.
The required accuracy should be defined by the applicable application and equipment specifications.
12. SAS Testing and Commissioning
12.1 Introduction to SAS Commissioning
Substation Automation System commissioning is the final stage of verifying that all protection, control, communication and monitoring functions operate according to the approved project design.
For a NARI-based SAS installation, commissioning should cover the complete system rather than testing individual IEDs in isolation.
The commissioning process should verify:
- Protection IED operation.
- BCU operation.
- Circuit breaker monitoring and control.
- Disconnector and earthing switch monitoring.
- GOOSE communication.
- MMS communication.
- SCADA integration.
- Gateway operation.
- Protocol conversion.
- Network redundancy.
- Time synchronization.
- Alarm and event recording.
12.2 Pre-Commissioning Checks
Before starting functional tests, verify the following:
| Item | Verification |
|---|---|
| Protection IEDs | Correct model and configuration |
| BCUs | Correct bay configuration |
| Communication controllers | Correct hardware and firmware |
| Ethernet network | Correct topology |
| IP addressing | No address conflicts |
| VLAN configuration | Correct network segmentation |
| IEC 61850 | Correct SCL configuration |
| GOOSE | Publisher and subscriber mapping |
| MMS | Client-server communication |
| IEC 103 | Correct device addresses and settings |
| Gateway | Correct protocol configuration |
| SCADA | Correct database and graphics |
| Time synchronization | Correct time source |
| Redundancy | Correct network configuration |
12.3 Protection IED Testing
Protection testing should be carried out independently of the overall SAS testing.
Typical tests include:
- Protection element pickup.
- Protection element operation.
- Trip output verification.
- Binary input verification.
- Measurement verification.
- Event recording.
- Disturbance recording.
- Communication status.
For example, an overcurrent protection test should verify the protection element’s response and the resulting indications transmitted to the SAS.
12.4 BCU Functional Testing
The BCU commissioning process should verify:
- Circuit breaker open indication.
- Circuit breaker closed indication.
- Disconnector position.
- Earthing switch position.
- Local/remote mode.
- Control permission.
- Electrical interlocking.
- Mechanical interlocking interfaces.
- Alarm indications.
- Communication with station SCADA.
12.5 GOOSE Communication Testing
GOOSE tests should verify the complete communication path.
| Test | Expected result |
|---|---|
| Publisher activation | Correct message transmitted |
| Subscriber detection | Message received |
| Dataset verification | Correct information |
| Signal change | Correct status update |
| Quality verification | Correct quality |
| Communication loss | Correct supervision |
| Recovery | Communication restored |
| Application response | Correct interlocking or protection response |
12.6 MMS Testing
Verify:
- MMS association.
- Logical device browsing.
- Logical node access.
- Measurement acquisition.
- Status acquisition.
- Report control blocks.
- Buffered reporting.
- General interrogation.
- Control operations, where supported.
12.7 SCADA Point-to-Point Testing
Point-to-point testing is one of the most important SAS commissioning activities.
Each signal must be checked from the field or IED through the communication system to the SCADA HMI.
For example:
Circuit Breaker
|
v
Bay Control Unit
|
v
IEC 61850 / Gateway
|
v
SCADA Database
|
v
Operator HMI
The engineer should verify:
- Physical equipment status.
- BCU input status.
- IEC 61850 data object.
- Gateway mapping, where applicable.
- SCADA database value.
- HMI indication.
The same procedure should be used for analog measurements, alarms and control commands.
12.8 Remote Control Testing
Remote control testing should be performed under an approved operational safety procedure.
Typical tests include:
- Breaker opening.
- Breaker closing.
- Disconnector operation.
- Earthing switch operation.
- Select-before-operate sequence.
- Command termination.
- Interlocking supervision.
- Position feedback.
- Local/remote control authority.
All tests must be coordinated with the substation operator to prevent unintended equipment operation.
12.9 Gateway Testing
Verify:
- Communication with each connected IED.
- Correct protocol configuration.
- Data acquisition.
- Data mapping.
- Event transmission.
- Measurement scaling.
- Remote control forwarding.
- Communication failure alarms.
- Recovery after communication interruption.
12.10 Redundancy Testing
Verify the performance of:
- Redundant Ethernet networks.
- PRP or HSR, where implemented.
- Redundant communication controllers.
- Redundant SCADA servers.
- Redundant power supplies.
- Alternative communication paths.
The objective is to ensure that a single failure does not cause an unacceptable loss of system functionality.
12.11 Final SAS Commissioning Checklist
NARI SAS commissioning checklist
Practical checklist for project engineers
Completion
0/19
Protection IED configuration verifiedBCU configuration verifiedCircuit breaker status verifiedDisconnector status verifiedEarthing switch status verifiedProtection trip indications verifiedGOOSE publisher and subscriber testedMMS communication testedReport Control Blocks testedSCADA database verifiedSCADA graphics verifiedRemote control testedIEC 60870-5-103 communication testedGateway protocol conversion testedNetwork redundancy testedTime synchronization testedAlarm and event recording testedFinal configuration backups completedCommissioning reports approved
Reset checklist
12.12 Commissioning Documentation
The final documentation package should include:
- Approved SAS architecture.
- Network topology drawings.
- IED configuration files.
- SCL files.
- Protection settings.
- BCU configuration.
- IP address schedule.
- GOOSE signal matrix.
- MMS point list.
- IEC 103 point list.
- Gateway database.
- SCADA database.
- Time synchronization configuration.
- Network redundancy test reports.
- Point-to-point test sheets.
- Remote control test reports.
- Final commissioning report.
13. Engineering Challenges and Common SAS Problems
A successful SAS project requires coordination between protection, automation, SCADA and communication engineering teams.
Some common challenges are listed below.
| Engineering problem | Typical cause | Recommended solution |
|---|---|---|
| Incorrect breaker indication | Wrong signal mapping | Verify BCU input and data object |
| GOOSE communication failure | Incorrect dataset or APPID | Check publisher and subscriber |
| SCADA measurements incorrect | Scaling error | Verify engineering units and scaling |
| Remote control rejected | Incorrect control model or permissions | Check control configuration |
| Missing protection events | Incorrect reporting configuration | Verify RCB and dataset |
| Gateway communication failure | Protocol mismatch | Check communication settings |
| IEC 103 communication unstable | Serial wiring or baud rate | Check physical interface |
| Network redundancy failure | Incorrect PRP/HSR configuration | Verify network topology |
| Incorrect event timestamps | Time synchronization issue | Check time source and protocol |
| Interlocking malfunction | Incorrect logic or stale signal | Verify complete signal path |
| Communication alarms | Network or device problem | Inspect diagnostics and logs |
13.1 Cybersecurity Considerations
Modern SAS installations must also consider cybersecurity.
Important engineering measures include:
- Controlled engineering workstation access.
- Role-based user permissions.
- Network segmentation.
- Firewall configuration.
- Secure remote access.
- Configuration backups.
- Software and firmware management.
- Security event monitoring.
- Controlled use of maintenance ports.
- Appropriate implementation of IEC 62351 security mechanisms.
Cybersecurity controls should be designed without compromising protection and operational requirements.
13.2 Maintenance and Lifecycle Management
After commissioning, SAS equipment requires ongoing maintenance.
Typical activities include:
- Periodic IED health checks.
- Communication diagnostics.
- Network switch inspections.
- Configuration backups.
- SCADA database verification.
- Time synchronization checks.
- Gateway diagnostics.
- Alarm review.
- Firmware and cybersecurity management.
- Review of communication failure records.
A controlled configuration management process is particularly important when modifying GOOSE datasets, SCL files or interlocking logic.
14. NARI SAS Engineering: Practical Project Example
Consider a 132 kV substation containing:
- Two transmission line bays.
- Two transformer bays.
- One bus coupler bay.
- One busbar protection system.
- One station SCADA system.
- One communication gateway.
- One redundant Ethernet network.
The objective is to integrate all protection and control equipment into a centralized SAS.
14.1 Equipment Architecture
| Equipment | Quantity | Function |
|---|---|---|
| NARI line protection IEDs | 2 | Transmission line protection |
| NARI transformer protection IEDs | 2 | Transformer protection |
| NARI bay control units | As required | Bay control |
| Busbar protection IED | As required | Busbar protection |
| Communication gateway | As designed | Protocol integration |
| Ethernet switches | As designed | Station network |
| SCADA servers | As designed | Monitoring and control |
| Time server | As designed | Clock synchronization |
This is an illustrative project configuration, not a prescribed NARI equipment bill of materials.
14.2 Communication Requirements
The following communication functions are required:
| Communication | Application |
|---|---|
| MMS | IED monitoring and control |
| GOOSE | Protection signals and interlocking |
| IEC 60870-5-103 | Integration of compatible legacy relays |
| IEC 60870-5-104 | Remote control center communication |
| NTP/SNTP or PTP | Time synchronization |
| PRP or HSR | Network redundancy |
14.3 Engineering Workflow
Step 1 — Protection Engineering
Configure the protection functions, settings, binary inputs and outputs.
Step 2 — Bay Control Engineering
Configure breaker control, switchgear status and interlocking.
Step 3 — IEC 61850 Engineering
Create the data models, datasets, GOOSE control blocks and report control blocks.
Step 4 — Network Engineering
Configure Ethernet switches, IP addresses, VLANs and redundancy.
Step 5 — Gateway Engineering
Configure protocol interfaces and signal mappings.
Step 6 — SCADA Engineering
Create the database, alarms, event lists and single-line graphics.
Step 7 — Time Synchronization
Configure the time server and verify IED synchronization.
Step 8 — System Integration
Connect the equipment and verify the communication architecture.
Step 9 — Testing
Perform protection, GOOSE, MMS, gateway, SCADA and redundancy tests.
Step 10 — Commissioning
Complete point-to-point verification, operational testing and documentation.
14.4 Expected Results
After successful commissioning, the system should provide:
- Centralized substation monitoring.
- Remote and local equipment control.
- Integrated protection indications.
- Digital interlocking.
- Automatic event recording.
- Reliable communication between bay and station levels.
- Remote control center connectivity.
- Improved operational visibility.
- Easier troubleshooting and maintenance.
15. Recommended Technical Standards and References
Engineers working on NARI Substation Automation Systems should become familiar with the following standards.
| Standard | Engineering subject |
|---|---|
| IEC 61850-3 | General requirements for substation communication |
| IEC 61850-4 | System and project management |
| IEC 61850-5 | Communication requirements |
| IEC 61850-6 | SCL configuration |
| IEC 61850-7-1 | Basic communication structure |
| IEC 61850-7-2 | Abstract communication service interface |
| IEC 61850-7-3 | Common data classes |
| IEC 61850-7-4 | Logical node classes |
| IEC 61850-8-1 | MMS and Ethernet mapping |
| IEC 61850-9-2 | Sampled Values |
| IEC 61850-10 | Conformance testing |
| IEC 60870-5-103 | Protection equipment communication |
| IEC 60870-5-104 | Network access for telecontrol |
| IEC 62351 | Power system communication security |
| IEC 62439-3 | PRP and HSR network redundancy |
| IEEE 1588 | Precision Time Protocol |
In addition to these standards, engineers should obtain the relevant NARI product manuals, communication manuals, ICD files, configuration guides and firmware-specific documentation.
16. NARI Substation Automation Training by Elec-Engg
Substation Automation System engineering requires knowledge of protection relays, bay control, communication protocols, network architecture, SCADA integration and commissioning procedures.
Understanding only the communication protocol is not sufficient. Engineers must understand how protection, control and communication functions interact in a real electrical substation.
Elec-Engg provides practical power system protection and substation automation training by Dr Saeed Roostaee / Elec-Engg, focusing on applied engineering knowledge and practical industrial applications.
Relevant training subjects include:
- Power system protection fundamentals.
- Protection relay configuration and testing.
- IEC 61850 engineering.
- MMS and GOOSE communication.
- GOOSE-based protection interlocking.
- NARI protection and control architecture.
- Bay control and switching applications.
- Substation SCADA engineering.
- IEC 60870-5-103 and IEC 60870-5-104.
- Communication gateway engineering.
- Industrial Ethernet and network redundancy.
- Time synchronization.
- IEDScout and Wireshark.
- SAS testing and commissioning.
Training delivery options include structured self-paced courses, recorded technical training, live online sessions and customized face-to-face or in-house programs.
For customized NARI training, practical exercises can be developed around the actual equipment models, firmware, engineering software, communication manuals and project requirements available to the organization.
Explore Elec-Engg training resources:
- Elec-Engg — Power System Protection and Substation Automation
- Substation Automation Training
- Structured Self-Paced Training
- Pre-Recorded Video Training
17. Conclusion
NARI Substation Automation Systems combine protection, bay control, communication and station-level supervision into an integrated architecture.
Successful SAS engineering requires a comprehensive understanding of the complete system, including protection IEDs, BCUs, station bus, process bus, GOOSE interlocking, MMS communication, SCADA integration, communication gateways and network redundancy.
The most important engineering activities include:
- Understanding the digital substation architecture.
- Selecting and integrating protection IEDs and BCUs.
- Designing station bus and process bus networks.
- Configuring GOOSE-based interlocking.
- Implementing MMS monitoring and control.
- Integrating station SCADA.
- Engineering communication gateways.
- Integrating IEC 60870-5-103 devices.
- Designing IEC 61850 communication networks.
- Implementing PRP/HSR redundancy where required.
- Configuring time synchronization.
- Performing complete SAS testing and commissioning.
For protection and substation automation engineers, practical knowledge of these subjects is essential for designing, integrating, maintaining and troubleshooting modern digital substations.
