- Introduction
- 1. Role of the HMI in a Substation Automation System
- 2. Typical GE SAS HMI and SCADA Architecture
- 3. Engineering the Substation Single-Line Diagram
- 4. Measurement Integration and Scaling
- 5. Alarm Management Engineering
- 6. Sequence of Events and Time Stamping
- 7. Operator Control Engineering
- 8. SCADA Gateway Engineering
- 9. Redundancy and Failover
- 10. HMI and SCADA Cybersecurity
- 11. Practical Example: Engineering a Feeder Bay HMI
- Step 1: Review the electrical design
- Step 2: Identify the source signals
- Step 3: Configure the IED communication
- Step 4: Create the HMI database
- Step 5: Develop the single-line diagram
- Step 6: Configure alarms and events
- Step 7: Configure operator controls
- Step 8: Configure gateway mapping
- Step 9: Perform functional testing
- Step 10: Complete documentation
- 12. HMI and SCADA FAT Testing
- 13. Site Acceptance Testing and Commissioning
- 14. Common GE SAS HMI and SCADA Problems
- 15. HMI and SCADA Engineering Checklist
- 16. Recommended Engineering Documentation
- 17. Conclusion
- 18. Practical Training by Elec-Engg
- Frequently Asked Questions
- 1. What is the role of HMI in GE SAS?
- 2. What is the difference between HMI and SCADA gateway?
- 3. Can GE Multilin relays communicate directly with an HMI?
- 4. Is IEC 61850 required for GE SAS HMI integration?
- 5. What is the purpose of SOE in substation automation?
- 6. Why is time synchronization important in an SAS?
- 7. What is the difference between alarm acknowledgement and alarm reset?
- 8. What is select-before-operate control?
- 9. Which protocols are commonly used between an SAS gateway and a control centre?
- 10. How should HMI and SCADA systems be tested?
- 11. Does a successful communication test prove that the HMI is correctly engineered?
- 12. Can Elec-Engg provide practical substation automation training?
Introduction
A Substation Automation System (SAS) is not complete simply because protection relays communicate successfully or IEC 61850 messages are exchanged across the station network. Operators also need a reliable Human-Machine Interface (HMI), a well-engineered SCADA gateway, accurate alarms and events, and secure control facilities.
The HMI is the operational interface between substation personnel and the electrical installation. It presents the status of circuit breakers, disconnectors, earthing switches, protection functions, measurements, alarms and communication systems. It also enables authorized operators to execute switching commands and monitor the response of the substation.
In a GE-based Substation Automation System, HMI and SCADA engineering must be coordinated with the installed GE Multilin protection relays, bay controllers, communication infrastructure and supervisory control requirements. The actual configuration tools and supported functions depend on the selected GE equipment, software platform, firmware and system architecture.
This article explains the practical engineering of GE SAS HMI and SCADA systems, including single-line diagrams, point databases, alarm management, sequence of events, operator control, gateway integration, testing and troubleshooting.
1. Role of the HMI in a Substation Automation System
The HMI provides a centralized operational view of the substation. Depending on the system design, it may be installed locally in the control room, hosted on an engineering or operator workstation, or distributed across redundant operator stations.
Typical HMI functions include:
- Displaying the substation single-line diagram.
- Showing circuit breaker and disconnector positions.
- Displaying voltage, current, power, frequency and energy measurements.
- Presenting protection and equipment alarms.
- Displaying event records and sequence-of-events information.
- Enabling authorized switching operations.
- Showing communication and IED health.
- Providing access to equipment details and operational measurements.
- Recording operator actions where supported.
- Supporting local operational supervision during communication failures, according to the system design.
The HMI must not be treated as an independent graphical application. Its database, communication interfaces, control logic and displayed information must correspond to the actual electrical design and configured IED data models.
2. Typical GE SAS HMI and SCADA Architecture
A typical architecture can include several functional layers.
2.1 Bay-level devices
Bay-level equipment may include:
- GE Multilin protection relays.
- Bay control units.
- Metering devices.
- Transformer monitoring equipment.
- Other intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).
These devices provide measurements, indications, alarms and control interfaces.
2.2 Station communication network
The station network connects the IEDs to operator workstations and gateways. Depending on the project, it may include:
- Managed Ethernet switches.
- Separate station and process network segments.
- VLANs.
- Redundant communication paths.
- Network monitoring facilities.
- Engineering access points.
Network architecture must be designed around the actual communication requirements and supported redundancy mechanisms. The presence of two Ethernet ports does not automatically mean that an IED supports PRP, HSR or another seamless redundancy protocol.
2.3 Station HMI
The station HMI receives information from the IEDs or an intermediate station-level server. It processes the information and presents it to operators through graphical displays, alarm lists, event lists and control dialogs.
2.4 SCADA gateway
The gateway provides communication between the substation automation system and the remote control centre.
Depending on the project, it may support protocols such as:
- IEC 61850 MMS.
- IEC 60870-5-104.
- DNP3.
- Modbus TCP or RTU.
The supported protocols depend on the gateway hardware, software licences and configuration.
2.5 Remote control centre
The remote control centre receives selected measurements, indications, alarms and events. It may also issue remote switching commands according to the operational philosophy and communication design.
A fundamental engineering requirement is to maintain consistency between the local HMI database and the remote SCADA point database.
3. Engineering the Substation Single-Line Diagram
The single-line diagram is one of the most important HMI displays. It provides operators with a graphical representation of the electrical topology.
A typical diagram may include:
- Incoming and outgoing feeders.
- Busbars and bus couplers.
- Circuit breakers.
- Disconnectors.
- Earthing switches.
- Power transformers.
- Current transformers and voltage transformers.
- Generators and auxiliary supplies.
- Measurement values.
- Protection and control indications.
3.1 Preparing the graphical design
Before creating the HMI diagram, the engineering team should obtain and verify:
- Approved substation single-line diagrams.
- Bay arrangement and equipment identification.
- Equipment tag numbers.
- Breaker and disconnector auxiliary contact assignments.
- CT and VT measurement assignments.
- Protection relay and bay controller signal lists.
- Operational control philosophy.
- Local and remote control requirements.
The HMI drawing should follow the approved electrical design. Equipment names and identifiers should match the project documentation and control centre database.
3.2 Dynamic equipment representation
A static symbol does not provide sufficient operational information. HMI symbols should change according to the actual status of the associated equipment.
For example, a circuit breaker symbol may display:
- Closed.
- Open.
- Intermediate or transitioning.
- Invalid or unknown.
- Communication failure.
The exact graphical representation is project-specific.
A critical distinction must be maintained between an equipment state and the quality of the information received. If communication is lost, the HMI should not continue displaying an old status as though it were confirmed to be current.
3.3 Breaker and disconnector status mapping
Consider a circuit breaker with two auxiliary contacts:
- 52a: closed when the breaker is closed.
- 52b: closed when the breaker is open.
The HMI logic may use these indications to determine the breaker position.
| 52a | 52b | Interpreted condition |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0 | Closed |
| 0 | 1 | Open |
| 0 | 0 | Intermediate, invalid or inconsistent |
| 1 | 1 | Inconsistent indication |
The final interpretation must follow the actual wiring, contact logic and device configuration.
A practical commissioning test should verify that the physical auxiliary contacts, IED indications, communication database and HMI symbol all agree.
3.4 Dynamic busbar coloring
Busbar coloring can help operators understand the electrical topology.
For example, the HMI may use different colors to represent:
- Energized busbar.
- De-energized busbar.
- Unknown electrical state.
- Grounded or isolated sections, where the system design supports reliable topology processing.
However, a busbar should not be shown as energized merely because a breaker is closed. The engineering must consider the relevant voltage measurements, switching device positions and topology rules.
If the HMI does not implement a validated topology processor, its coloring should be described as an indication based on configured status signals rather than a definitive electrical-state calculation.
4. Measurement Integration and Scaling
HMI measurements commonly include:
- Phase currents.
- Phase-to-phase voltages.
- Phase-to-neutral voltages.
- Active power.
- Reactive power.
- Apparent power.
- Frequency.
- Power factor.
- Active and reactive energy.
- Transformer temperatures and other monitored values.
4.1 Measurement scaling
Measurements may be transmitted as primary values or secondary values, depending on the IED configuration and communication interface.
The engineering team must verify:
- CT primary and secondary ratings.
- VT primary and secondary ratings.
- Engineering units.
- Measurement scaling factors.
- Sign conventions.
- Decimal precision.
- Phase assignment.
- Measurement validity and quality.
For example, if an IED reports secondary current, the HMI may need to apply the appropriate CT ratio to display primary current.
Assume:
- CT ratio: 800/1 A.
- Relay secondary current: 0.75 A.
The corresponding primary current is:
Primary current = 0.75 × 800 = 600 A.
If the relay already publishes the primary-scaled value, applying the CT ratio again would produce an incorrect result.
4.2 Measurement quality
A displayed numerical value is not necessarily valid simply because it is available.
Where supported by the communication model, the HMI should consider quality information such as:
- Validity.
- Test status.
- Operator-blocked status.
- Substituted value.
- Old or questionable data.
- Communication-related invalidity.
The graphical presentation should distinguish an actual zero measurement from an unavailable or invalid measurement.
4.3 Measurement validation
During commissioning, compare selected HMI values against:
- Relay front-panel measurements.
- Secondary injection or primary injection test results, as applicable.
- Calibrated test equipment.
- Independent metering.
- Remote SCADA indications.
Investigate differences in scaling, phase mapping, sign convention, update rate and quality handling.
5. Alarm Management Engineering
Alarm management is essential for safe and efficient substation operation.
A poorly designed alarm system may generate hundreds of messages without helping the operator identify the actual problem.
The engineering objective is to present relevant abnormal conditions clearly and consistently.
5.1 Typical substation alarms
Common alarm categories include:
Protection alarms
- Overcurrent protection operated.
- Earth-fault protection operated.
- Transformer differential protection operated.
- Distance protection operated.
- Restricted earth-fault protection operated.
- Breaker failure protection operated.
- Protection relay self-supervision alarm.
Circuit breaker alarms
- Circuit breaker failure.
- Spring charging failure.
- Low gas pressure, where applicable.
- Trip circuit supervision alarm.
- Discrepancy between breaker auxiliary contacts.
Communication alarms
- IED communication failure.
- Ethernet link failure.
- Gateway communication failure.
- Remote SCADA communication failure.
- Time synchronization failure.
Power supply alarms
- DC supply failure.
- Charger failure.
- Battery monitoring alarm.
- AC auxiliary supply failure.
System alarms
- HMI server failure.
- Database or application service failure.
- Redundancy switchover.
- Network switch alarm.
- Storage or event database capacity alarm.
5.2 Alarm priorities
An alarm priority structure should be defined during the design stage.
A typical project may use:
| Priority | General meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | Immediate operational attention required | Busbar differential protection operated |
| High | Serious abnormal condition | Transformer protection alarm |
| Medium | Abnormal condition requiring investigation | IED communication failure |
| Low | Maintenance or status information | Time synchronization warning |
These are illustrative categories. Actual priorities must follow the utility’s alarm philosophy and operating procedures.
5.3 Alarm acknowledgement
Acknowledgement means that an operator has recognized an alarm. It does not necessarily mean that the underlying abnormal condition has disappeared.
For example:
- A transformer protection alarm occurs.
- The HMI displays the alarm.
- The operator acknowledges it.
- The protection alarm remains active until the actual signal resets.
- The operator investigates the cause.
The HMI should distinguish acknowledged and unacknowledged alarms from active and cleared conditions.
5.4 Alarm filtering
Useful filtering options may include:
- Priority.
- Bay or feeder.
- Equipment type.
- Alarm category.
- Active or cleared status.
- Acknowledged or unacknowledged status.
- Time interval.
Filtering should help the operator locate relevant information without hiding important active alarms.
5.5 Alarm suppression and blocking
Alarm suppression may be required during approved maintenance activities or for known operational conditions.
However, suppression must be controlled and visible. The engineering design should define:
- Who can suppress an alarm.
- Which alarms may be suppressed.
- Whether suppression is temporary.
- How suppression is recorded.
- How the alarm is restored.
- Whether critical protection alarms are excluded from suppression.
Alarm suppression must never be used as a substitute for correcting an engineering or equipment problem.
6. Sequence of Events and Time Stamping
Sequence of Events (SOE) is particularly important during fault analysis.
When a fault occurs, protection relays, bay controllers and other IEDs may generate many events within milliseconds.
The event sequence helps engineers determine:
- Which protection function operated first.
- When the trip command was issued.
- When the circuit breaker opened.
- Whether breaker failure logic started.
- Whether intertripping or teleprotection signals were received.
- Whether the expected protection sequence occurred.
6.1 Source of event timestamps
Event timestamps may originate from individual IEDs, station-level servers or other system components.
The engineering team should identify the source of timestamps for each event class.
A centralized HMI timestamp is not automatically equivalent to the original event timestamp generated by the protection relay.
6.2 Time synchronization
Accurate SOE analysis requires coordinated time synchronization.
Depending on the equipment and design, synchronization may use:
- SNTP.
- NTP.
- PTP.
- IRIG-B.
- GPS-based clock systems.
Not every device supports every method.
The project should specify:
- The master time source.
- Distribution architecture.
- Supported synchronization protocol.
- Required accuracy.
- Holdover behavior.
- Alarm thresholds.
- Monitoring and commissioning procedures.
6.3 Example of SOE analysis
Consider a feeder fault with the following illustrative events:
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 10:15:20.100 | Phase overcurrent detected |
| 10:15:20.115 | Protection trip output activated |
| 10:15:20.130 | Breaker trip command received |
| 10:15:20.175 | Breaker auxiliary contact changes state |
| 10:15:20.190 | Breaker open indication received by HMI |
The time differences can help engineers evaluate the protection and breaker operating sequence.
These values are examples only. Actual timing depends on relay processing, output configuration, breaker mechanism and event recording resolution.
6.4 Common SOE problems
Typical problems include:
- Different IED clocks.
- Incorrect time zone settings.
- Daylight-saving inconsistencies.
- Loss of synchronization.
- Delayed event transmission.
- Incorrect event source mapping.
- HMI sorting by reception time instead of source time.
- Insufficient timestamp resolution.
A commissioning test should verify both the displayed event sequence and the original event timestamps.
7. Operator Control Engineering
The HMI may provide switching control for circuit breakers, disconnectors and other equipment.
Control engineering must be treated as a safety-critical activity.
7.1 Control modes
Typical control arrangements include:
- Local control at the equipment.
- Bay-level control.
- Station-level control.
- Remote control from the control centre.
The system must define which control authority is permitted at each level and how authority is transferred.
7.2 Select-before-operate and direct control
Two common control approaches are:
Select-before-operate (SBO)
The operator first selects the equipment and then issues the command. The system may perform selection confirmation and additional checks before execution.
Direct operate
The operator issues a command without a separate selection stage.
The appropriate method depends on the utility’s operational philosophy, protocol implementation and supported IED or gateway control model.
7.3 Typical breaker control sequence
A breaker closing operation may involve:
- Operator selects the required breaker.
- HMI displays the selected equipment.
- Operator requests the close operation.
- Control authority and interlocking conditions are evaluated.
- The command is transmitted to the relevant bay controller or IED.
- The device processes the command.
- The breaker mechanism operates.
- Auxiliary contacts update the breaker status.
- The HMI confirms the resulting state.
The system should not report a successful physical operation merely because a command was transmitted or accepted.
The final equipment status should be confirmed through the appropriate feedback signals.
7.4 Interlocking
Interlocking prevents prohibited switching operations.
For example, a disconnector may be prevented from operating while its associated circuit breaker is closed, depending on the equipment design and switching philosophy.
Interlocking may be implemented in:
- Bay control IEDs.
- Dedicated interlocking devices.
- Protection and control relays.
- Distributed IEC 61850 logic.
- Other approved control systems.
The actual location and implementation must be documented.
HMI-side checks can improve operator guidance, but they should not be assumed to replace safety-critical interlocking implemented in the control system.
7.5 Local and remote authority
The HMI should clearly indicate whether a bay is under local, bay, station or remote control authority.
Before commissioning, test:
- Local/remote selector status.
- Control authority transfer.
- Command rejection when authority is unavailable.
- Interlocking behavior.
- Command timeout.
- Command cancellation.
- Feedback confirmation.
- Unauthorized command attempts.
8. SCADA Gateway Engineering
The SCADA gateway connects the station automation system to the remote control centre.
Its primary purpose is to exchange selected information between the substation and supervisory control systems.
8.1 Gateway functions
Typical functions include:
- Reading data from bay-level IEDs.
- Mapping IED data to SCADA points.
- Transmitting indications and measurements.
- Transmitting alarms and events.
- Receiving remote control commands.
- Converting communication protocols.
- Managing communication sessions.
- Supporting redundant communication paths.
- Reporting communication and system health.
The gateway may also perform filtering, data processing and quality conversion according to the project specification.
8.2 IEC 61850 integration
Where IEC 61850 is used between the IEDs and gateway, the gateway may act as an MMS client and access supported server data from the IEDs.
Typical engineering tasks include:
- Identifying the IEDs.
- Establishing communication associations.
- Reading the required data model.
- Configuring datasets or report subscriptions where supported.
- Mapping data attributes to gateway points.
- Configuring control objects.
- Verifying quality and timestamp handling.
The gateway’s supported IEC 61850 client functions must be verified against its actual software version and licence.
8.3 IEC 60870-5-104 integration
IEC 60870-5-104 is commonly used for communication between a substation gateway and a remote control centre.
The engineering process typically includes:
- Defining the local and remote IP addresses.
- Configuring TCP communication parameters.
- Defining the common address of ASDU.
- Assigning information object addresses.
- Mapping indications.
- Mapping measurements.
- Configuring command points.
- Defining interrogation and reporting behavior.
- Configuring time synchronization.
- Testing connection recovery.
The exact parameter set must follow the selected gateway and control centre implementation.
8.4 DNP3 integration
Where DNP3 is required, the gateway and control centre must agree on:
- Outstation identity.
- Master identity.
- Point index assignments.
- Binary inputs.
- Analog inputs.
- Binary outputs.
- Analog outputs, if applicable.
- Event classes.
- Unsolicited reporting, if supported.
- Time synchronization.
- Control modes and command confirmation.
DNP3 implementation details and available features depend on the gateway and remote master.
8.5 Point database engineering
The SCADA point database is a critical engineering deliverable.
Each point should have a unique identifier and documented mapping.
A typical point list includes:
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| Point name | Unique engineering tag |
| Bay | Associated feeder or equipment |
| Source IED | Originating device |
| Source address | IEC 61850 reference or protocol address |
| SCADA address | Remote point address |
| Data type | Single-point, double-point, analog or command |
| Engineering unit | A, kV, MW, MVAr, Hz, etc. |
| Scaling | Conversion factor where required |
| Deadband | Analog reporting threshold where applicable |
| Quality | Validity and status handling |
| Timestamp | Source and event time requirements |
| Description | Operator-friendly text |
The point list should be controlled under revision management. Changes to IED configuration must be checked against the HMI and gateway databases.
9. Redundancy and Failover
Availability is an important requirement in many substations.
Depending on the design, redundancy may be implemented at several levels:
- Redundant HMI servers.
- Redundant SCADA gateways.
- Redundant network switches.
- Redundant communication paths.
- Redundant power supplies.
- Redundant time sources.
9.1 HMI server redundancy
A redundant HMI architecture may use active-standby or another supported arrangement.
The engineering team should verify:
- Which server is active.
- How standby synchronization works.
- Whether alarm and event databases remain consistent.
- How clients reconnect after failover.
- Whether operator controls remain available.
- How failover is indicated to the operator.
9.2 Gateway redundancy
Where two gateways are used, the design should define:
- Primary and standby roles.
- Data synchronization.
- Remote communication ownership.
- Command authority.
- Failover conditions.
- Recovery behavior.
- Duplicate event prevention.
The system must be tested under realistic failure conditions, not only by checking that two gateway devices are installed.
10. HMI and SCADA Cybersecurity
HMI and gateway systems are important cybersecurity assets.
Practical security measures include:
- Individual operator accounts.
- Role-based access control.
- Strong authentication.
- Controlled engineering access.
- Network segmentation.
- Firewall rules.
- Secure remote access.
- Application whitelisting where supported.
- Backup and recovery procedures.
- Audit logging.
- Security patch management.
- Controlled removable media.
- Monitoring of unauthorized access attempts.
IEC 62351 provides security-related specifications for parts of the IEC 61850 and other power system communication environments. Its applicability depends on the protocol, implementation and project requirements.
The engineering team should not assume that a system is secure simply because it uses IEC 61850 or an Ethernet network.
11. Practical Example: Engineering a Feeder Bay HMI
Consider a feeder bay with:
- One circuit breaker.
- Two disconnectors.
- One earthing switch.
- One protection relay.
- Current and voltage measurements.
- Remote control centre communication.
A practical engineering workflow is as follows.
Step 1: Review the electrical design
Obtain the approved single-line diagram, control schematic, equipment list and interlocking philosophy.
Confirm the identifiers for every switching device.
Step 2: Identify the source signals
Identify the relay or bay controller signals for:
- Breaker open and closed.
- Disconnector open and closed.
- Earthing switch open and closed.
- Protection trip.
- Protection start.
- Relay healthy.
- Local/remote status.
- Phase currents.
- Voltage measurements.
- Active and reactive power.
Step 3: Configure the IED communication
Configure the required communication interface and verify that the necessary data objects and attributes are available.
If IEC 61850 is used, verify the actual logical nodes, data objects, control models and reporting capabilities of the selected device.
Step 4: Create the HMI database
Create the corresponding point database and assign:
- Unique tag names.
- Data types.
- Engineering units.
- Quality handling.
- Timestamp requirements.
- Alarm priorities.
- Control permissions.
Step 5: Develop the single-line diagram
Create the feeder bay graphic and associate each symbol with its database point.
Configure the breaker and disconnector symbols to reflect their actual statuses.
Step 6: Configure alarms and events
Create alarm definitions for protection operation, equipment faults and communication problems.
Verify alarm priority, acknowledgement and reset behavior.
Step 7: Configure operator controls
Configure the approved control sequence and interlocking interface.
Ensure that command acceptance and actual equipment movement are treated as separate events.
Step 8: Configure gateway mapping
Map the selected indications, measurements, alarms and controls to the remote SCADA protocol database.
Check every point against the approved point list.
Step 9: Perform functional testing
Test the physical or simulated signals, IED data, HMI displays and remote SCADA indications.
Step 10: Complete documentation
Save the approved configuration, point list, HMI database, gateway configuration and test records under revision control.
12. HMI and SCADA FAT Testing
Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT) should verify the HMI and gateway before site installation.
A typical FAT includes:
Graphic testing
- Correct single-line diagram.
- Correct equipment names.
- Correct breaker and disconnector symbols.
- Correct dynamic status changes.
- Correct measurement display.
Alarm testing
- Alarm generation.
- Alarm priority.
- Alarm acknowledgement.
- Alarm clearing.
- Alarm filtering.
- Alarm history.
SOE testing
- Timestamp accuracy.
- Event sequence.
- Source identification.
- Event sorting.
- Time synchronization failure indication.
Control testing
- Correct equipment selection.
- Command execution.
- Interlocking rejection.
- Local/remote authority.
- Command timeout.
- Feedback confirmation.
Gateway testing
- Protocol connection.
- Point mapping.
- Analog scaling.
- Quality handling.
- Time tagging.
- Remote control.
- Communication recovery.
Redundancy testing
- HMI server failover.
- Gateway failover.
- Network path failure.
- Recovery after restoration.
13. Site Acceptance Testing and Commissioning
Site Acceptance Testing (SAT) verifies the installed system against the real substation equipment.
Important activities include:
- Verify installed network connections.
- Confirm IED communication.
- Check device names and IP addresses.
- Verify breaker and disconnector indications.
- Compare measurements with relay readings.
- Test alarm and event generation.
- Verify time synchronization.
- Test approved local and remote controls.
- Verify interlocking.
- Test control centre communication.
- Perform redundancy tests.
- Record and close commissioning defects.
A successful communication test does not prove that the HMI database is correct. Every important indication, measurement and command should be checked end to end.
14. Common GE SAS HMI and SCADA Problems
Problem 1: Breaker status is incorrect
Possible causes:
- Incorrect auxiliary contact wiring.
- Reversed 52a and 52b mapping.
- Incorrect data attribute mapping.
- Wrong signal polarity.
- Stale communication data.
Recommended checks:
- Inspect the breaker control schematic.
- Verify physical auxiliary contacts.
- Compare relay indications with the HMI.
- Check the configured data reference.
- Confirm quality and communication status.
Problem 2: HMI measurements differ from relay measurements
Possible causes:
- Incorrect CT or VT ratio.
- Double scaling.
- Wrong engineering unit.
- Incorrect sign convention.
- Incorrect phase mapping.
Recommended checks:
- Compare raw IED values.
- Check scaling factors.
- Verify the relay configuration.
- Confirm primary or secondary value selection.
Problem 3: Alarms appear late
Possible causes:
- Communication delays.
- Polling interval configuration.
- Report configuration.
- Gateway processing delay.
- HMI application processing.
- Network congestion.
Recommended checks:
- Compare source and reception timestamps.
- Inspect the relevant communication reports.
- Capture network traffic where appropriate.
- Check gateway and HMI processing logs.
Problem 4: SOE events are out of sequence
Possible causes:
- Unsynchronized IED clocks.
- Incorrect time zone configuration.
- Different timestamp sources.
- Incorrect event sorting.
- Reception-time sorting instead of source-time sorting.
Recommended checks:
- Inspect time synchronization status.
- Compare timestamps from multiple IEDs.
- Verify HMI event handling.
- Confirm the configured time source.
Problem 5: Remote SCADA shows incorrect points
Possible causes:
- Incorrect information object address.
- Wrong common address of ASDU.
- Point mapping error.
- Incorrect scaling.
- Incorrect data type.
- Quality conversion problems.
Recommended checks:
- Compare the approved point list with the gateway database.
- Verify protocol addresses.
- Inspect communication traffic.
- Test individual points from the source IED to the control centre.
Problem 6: Remote control is rejected
Possible causes:
- Local control mode selected.
- Control authority unavailable.
- Interlocking condition not satisfied.
- Incorrect control model.
- Command timeout.
- Communication failure.
- Remote operator permissions not configured.
Recommended checks:
- Verify control authority.
- Check interlocking conditions.
- Inspect the control command sequence.
- Verify gateway and IED control configuration.
- Confirm command feedback.
15. HMI and SCADA Engineering Checklist
Before commissioning, verify the following:
- Approved single-line diagram is available.
- Equipment identifiers are consistent.
- Breaker and disconnector indications are correctly mapped.
- Invalid and intermediate states are handled.
- Measurement scaling is verified.
- Measurement quality is displayed appropriately.
- Alarm priorities are approved.
- Alarm acknowledgement and reset behavior are tested.
- SOE timestamps are verified.
- Time synchronization is healthy.
- Operator roles and permissions are configured.
- Control authority is correctly implemented.
- Interlocking is tested.
- Gateway point mapping is verified.
- Remote protocol communication is tested.
- Redundancy and failover are tested.
- Cybersecurity requirements are reviewed.
- Configuration backups are available.
- FAT and SAT records are completed.
16. Recommended Engineering Documentation
A professional GE SAS HMI and SCADA project should maintain the following documents:
- SAS architecture drawing.
- HMI workstation architecture.
- Network architecture and IP address list.
- Approved single-line diagrams.
- HMI graphic database.
- IED signal list.
- Alarm and event list.
- SCADA point list.
- IEC 61850 data mapping documents.
- Gateway protocol configuration.
- Control and interlocking philosophy.
- Time synchronization design.
- Cybersecurity configuration document.
- FAT procedure and report.
- SAT procedure and report.
- Configuration backup and revision register.
These documents are essential for future maintenance, troubleshooting, extension and replacement of equipment.
17. Conclusion
GE SAS HMI and SCADA engineering requires more than creating graphical displays and connecting a gateway to a remote control centre. It involves coordinated engineering of the electrical topology, IED data, measurements, alarms, events, control authority, interlocking, communication protocols and cybersecurity.
A well-engineered HMI should present accurate operational information, clearly identify abnormal conditions and support safe switching operations. The SCADA gateway must exchange the correct information with the remote control centre while preserving data quality, timestamps and control security.
For protection and commissioning engineers, the most important principle is to verify the complete signal path: from the physical equipment and protection relay through the station communication network, HMI and gateway to the remote control centre.
18. Practical Training by Elec-Engg
Elec-Engg provides practical technical training by Dr Saeed Roostaee (Electrical Engineering).
Our power system protection and substation automation training is designed for practicing engineers who need to understand real engineering workflows, equipment configuration, communication, testing and troubleshooting.
Relevant training subjects include:
- GE Multilin protection relays and practical relay configuration.
- IEC 61850 engineering, MMS and GOOSE communication.
- Substation Automation System architecture and integration.
- HMI and SCADA engineering.
- SCADA gateway configuration and protocol integration.
- IEC 60870-5-104, DNP3 and Modbus communication.
- Protection and control testing and commissioning.
- IEDScout and Wireshark for communication analysis.
- Integration of protection relays with station-level systems.
Training delivery options include pre-recorded video courses, structured self-paced training, live online training, face-to-face courses and customized in-house programs.
Explore our technical training resources:
Website: https://elec-engg.com/
Contact and training enquiries: https://elec-engg.com/contact/
Frequently Asked Questions
1. What is the role of HMI in GE SAS?
The HMI provides operators with a graphical interface to monitor substation equipment, measurements, alarms, events, communication status and authorized switching operations.
2. What is the difference between HMI and SCADA gateway?
The HMI primarily provides local operator visualization and control. The SCADA gateway exchanges selected information between the substation automation system and a remote control centre. Some architectures combine or distribute these functions across multiple servers.
3. Can GE Multilin relays communicate directly with an HMI?
Many GE Multilin relays support communication interfaces and protocols that can be integrated into an HMI or station-level system. Actual capabilities depend on the relay model, hardware, firmware, licences and configured protocol.
4. Is IEC 61850 required for GE SAS HMI integration?
No. IEC 61850 is widely used in modern substation automation, but other communication protocols may be used depending on the installed equipment and project requirements.
5. What is the purpose of SOE in substation automation?
SOE records the time sequence of events from protection relays, bay controllers and other devices. It is particularly useful for analyzing protection operations, breaker behavior and substation disturbances.
6. Why is time synchronization important in an SAS?
Accurate time synchronization allows engineers to correlate events from different IEDs and reconstruct the sequence of a disturbance.
7. What is the difference between alarm acknowledgement and alarm reset?
Acknowledgement confirms that an operator has recognized an alarm. Reset indicates that the underlying alarm condition has returned to its normal state or that the relevant reset condition has been satisfied.
8. What is select-before-operate control?
Select-before-operate is a control method in which an operator first selects the target equipment and then issues the operating command. The implementation depends on the device and communication control model.
9. Which protocols are commonly used between an SAS gateway and a control centre?
Common options include IEC 60870-5-104 and DNP3. IEC 61850 MMS and Modbus may also be used in relevant system architectures.
10. How should HMI and SCADA systems be tested?
Testing should include graphics, equipment status, measurement scaling, alarms, SOE timestamps, operator controls, interlocking, gateway mapping, remote communication and redundancy.
11. Does a successful communication test prove that the HMI is correctly engineered?
No. Communication only confirms that information can be exchanged. The actual signal mapping, equipment status, scaling, quality, timestamps and control behavior must also be verified.
12. Can Elec-Engg provide practical substation automation training?
Yes. Elec-Engg provides practical technical training by Dr Saeed Roostaee (Electrical Engineering), covering protection relays, IEC 61850, substation automation, SCADA integration, engineering tools, testing and commissioning.
